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Be~gium provides an especiall;i7 interesti~g subject for the
study of foodstuffs_ production, SU}?ply, _and consumption duri~g
World War II.

Of all the nations in New Order Europe, _it was

the least able to feed itself, that is, to survive under the
conditions of agricultural autarchy imposed by the Germans in
the food-dependent nations which they occupied.
-

Prewar Belgium

-

imported over one-half of its total consumption requirements,
mainly from overseas.

1

But the nation's .vulnerability to

blockade or embargo was greater than even this round _figure
would suggest, since feedgrains accounted for the bulk of
foodstuffs imports.

Before the war, 79 percent and 75 percent

respectively of national fat and protein consumption requirementsdepended·on fodder from foreign sources.

The ratio of Belgian

farmland per capita, the lowest in Europe, put the nation at a
second great disadvantage.

In Belgium 457 persons had to be

fed from 100 hectares as compared for instance with 372 in the
Netherlands. 2 A third disadvantage was historical in character:
, at once a Continental outpost of Manchestertum and at the same
time divided into warring language factions, Belgium lacked
traditions of the sort that might have facilitated the imposition

of

central controls over the agricultural economy.

These

disadvant~ges were nonetheless overcome during the occupation.
·The Be;tgian public, _hu~g-ry and debilitated though it was, _did
not experience famine in the months between June 1940 and August
1944.

Nor did it suffer on a serious scale any ~alady worse than

undernourishment.

How was it in fact able to survive?
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The question has a wider relevance than appears evident at
first blush.

It is often maintained in Belgium that economic

colla,bbration, the so-called "Politics of J?roquction, 11 was the
3
inevitable consequence of a dependence on foodstuffs imports.
To secure the agricultural_ goods necessary for survival, the
argument holds, it was necessary to produce manufactures for
the German war economy.

It is, however, evident at a_glance

that Belgium received very little indeed in the way of foodstuffs
as compensation for its sales of industrial_ goods to German
buyers.

They have been estimated at between two-thirds·and three-

quarters of total output. 4

As for the foodstuffs imports,

Jean Colard-in L'Alimentation de la Belgique sous l'Occupation
Allemande 1940-1944 ~stimates that for breadgrain, the most
important import product, Belgium received over the period as
a whole. from all sources some 870,350 tons, of which 637,988
5
tons came from the Reich.
Total breadgrain imports for the
occupation, in other words, equalled about three-quarters of
the 1935-1938 annual average of 1.28 million tons.
no imports of feedgrains.)

(There were

Taking account of exports to- the

Reich, Brandt estimates net Belgian food imports, expressed in
. grain equivalents, at 240,000 tons. 6 But consideration must
also be given in the food balance to consumption by Germans in
the Command Area (Befehlsbereich) of Belgian·agricultural
·';}

products.

A.t a minimum, this amounted to twice Belgium 1 s food

exI?orts to the Reich.

Germans, it seems, ate more Belgian food

during the occupation than Belgians German!

It must also be
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emphasized that over the per·iod from 1940 to 1944, _the nation's
food imports fell sharply, while at the same time the sale of
industrial products to German buyers rose.

Tonn~ge imports

from all sources of wheat, _rye, flour, .and s·tarches decx:eased
from 434,J,16 i.n 1940-41, .to 211,661 in 1941-42, _to 77,140 in
·1942-43, _while increasing slightiy to 127,453 in 1943-44. 7
To be sure, such figure_s, estimates, and approximations as the
above leave a good deal unsaid about the Belgian food supply.
They do, however, point inescapably to.the conclusion that
during the occupation, particularly in the later years, the
nation managed to feed itself largely by means of its own resources.
It is,· in other words, appropriate to ask whether, from the
standpoint of Belgium's food requirements, it _was in fact . ·
necessary for the land to become the armorer of the Reich.
Reich food policy towards Belgium, to the extent that there
was one, rested with the civil affairs executive (Military
Administration) of the Militarbefehlshaber in Belgien und Nordfrankreich, the occupation government in _power from May 1940
to July 1944.

Its task was to see to it .that the approximately

, 6.8 million non-farm Belgians received ~hat Berlin had a~rived
at as the minimum daily per capita food consumption requirements
.

needed for human maintenance, namely 1200-:1300 calories a day.

8

(];>reference was of course to be given persons working directly
in the. interests of the Reich.)

This figure. represented about

half the desirable minimum and slightly less than forty percent
of average pre-war Belgian consumption.

To attain even this

-4pitifully low ration level. would, _however, _have req~ired additional
annual output (or importation) of .some

soo;o_oo

tons of wheat,

60,000 tons of rye, .?J.nd 260, o_oo tons of barl·ey, _to mention only
the most important of imported carbohydrates.

It would also have

required bo~h equitable distribution and restraints on the
consumption_of non-Belgians in the Command Area.
In pursuit of these aims, the Military Administration had
to face huge problems, not the least of which was its own lack
of power.

With a staff of less than a thousand and few influential

supporters in Berlin, it had little voice in European food policy
and could exercise only limited control over the economic behavior·
of Wehrmacht

units and personnel stationed in the Command Area.

It also h:..~ no choice but to depend.en Belgia!l:;. ·to do the ac-t'.lal
work of administering the agricultural economy. 9
But in this respect, the nation's traditions presented real
difficulties.

Since responsibilities for food production and

suppl.y were divided, the Mil.itary Administration found itself

having to create a new super~agency, the Corporation Nationale_
de l'Alimentation et de l'Agriculture (CNAA),to administer the
agricultural economy.
As a

The new organization was, however, weak.

result, the Military Administration, with Belgian adrninistrators

in tow, _moved with· great caution in setting policy.

They did

not in particul.ar risk imposir1g the one fundamental measure
~

necessary to step up agricultural self-_suffici.ency.

It was to

increase production of crops for direct human consumption-by
convetting a portion of Belgium's surprisingli large area of
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grazing·land to farmland~

Belgo-German farm administrators

also .did surl?risingly litUe to introduce n.ew crops into
cultivation.

To regulate output, the ~ilitary Administration

and CNAA relied mainly on delivery quotas.

These were, however,

set low and made flexible eno~gh to leave peasant cultivators
with substantial surplusses to dispose of, albeit for reasons.
of·prestige this fact could never be operily·admitted.
The official food policy, while hardly adeqµate, cannot be
described as a total failure.

supplies of agricultural goods

increased steadily during the occupation.

In Winter and Spring

1941, mass starvation was an imminent danger; thereafter it.became
increasingly less difficult to meet targeted ration levels.

Even

so, hunger might well have .become famine had not huge amounts of
unofficial output entered the market.

By all odds, it was equal

in amount ·to that distributed by the authorities.

This additional

production derived from the surplusses of peasant cultivators,
the yields of "miniplots," home gardens and public lands, and
from the traffic of smuggl:ers.

Doubtless there were enormous

inequities in the distribution of this food.

It is nonetheless

incontrovertible that for the urban public of the occupied land
the marche clandestin--the black market--provided the margin of
survival.
A,

;:

discussion of the food problems of occupied Belgium must .

really b~gin by emphasizing the criminal ind"ifference with whichBerlin viewed the whole matter except, that is, until shortages
threatened to disrupt-production.

Four Year Plan simply
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ordered the Military Administration to see to it that Be;t.gium
feed itself.

Neither it nor any other German min,istry or agency

made any serious attempt to determine if such a thing were
actually J?Ossible, .offered assistance in raising domestic production,
or support in .. gaini~g access to fore~gn sources of foodstuffs.·
The efforts of both the Military Administration and the leaders
of Belgian business and the civil service to secure Berlin's
recognl tio·n of Belgium's special foodstuffs n.eeds all fell on
deaf ears.

·Nor was the OKW particularly helpful.in disciplining

the economic behavior of the Wehrmacht units stationed in the
Command Area.

The Reich in fact deviated only once from its

insistence that Belgium should take care of its own food problems.
This happened as a result of the na~r-famine of Wintet·and Spring
1941, which touched off miner strikes throughout the Borinage
and Li~gebasins, and for a time even jeopardized the "Politics
of Production."

The most abiding concern of the Reich with

regard to Belgian agriculture was, however, to cream off any
f~od surplusses above the minimum necessary for ~uman maintenance.
Beyond that, it simply left the Military Administration free to
\

struggle as best it could with the intractable food problems of·
the occupied land.
Berlin's lack of support together with the general food
shoJ;t~ges in Europe and disruptions due to military events are
',.

responsi.ble ;f;or the ''pi tif'ully inadequate II resul. ts of the many
attempts of the Military Administration, _some·of them through
Belgian intermediaries, to secure a reliable foreign source of
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staple products.

lO

The first failure was the effort to organize

an American food mission on the pattern ot the World War I
Committee for the Relief of Be~gium.
overhangs the whole affair.

A_general air of unreality

In-January 1941, several figures

from the "Hoover circle" arrived in Brussels •to study the Belgian
food situation.".

With the encour~gement of the Military Administration,

the head of the Belgian Red Cross and a pre-war diplomat, one
Prince de Ligne, were dispatched to Lisbon to conduct negotiations.
A representative of the delegation apparently even succeeded in
gaining passage to Washington.

Although discussions persisted

intermittently throughout the year, nothing haa been resolved
when, because of the entrance of the United·states into-the war,
contacts were broken off. 11
The failure to revive Belgium's prewar exchange of industr.ial
goods for French and Dutch agricultural products was a much more
serious matter~

Part of the p:i::-oblem with regard to France was.

_the priority which the Franco-German Armistice Commission in
Wiesbaden accorded French grain exports to the Reich and to
the Wehrmacht in France, some 800,000 tons per year.

Colard's

figures indicate that cereal imports from France were comparatively
insignificant.

From mid-1940 to mid-1941 they amounted to 54,679

tons of_ grain and from mid-1941 to mid-1942 to 10,000 tons.

In

1942-.1943 and in 1943-.1944 France exported to Belgium 15,222
"

and is,012 tons of -flour respectively. 12

The Military Administration's

final report notes, in addition, that France consistently ran
huge trade deficits with Belgium, in the end amounting to 328
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million RM less than total Be~gian exports to France o;e 842 .
million RM.

Wine was by far the most important rrench export

to _Belgium.

It reached 342,7_39 hl or more than twice pre'-war

levels and totalled some 60.5 million RM in value.

Approximately

two-thirds of this barrel~ge was re-_exported from Belgium to the
Reich, _and rnos_t of the rest apparently consumed on the spot by
Wehrmacht personnel. 13 In the Dutch case, the results, with one
exception, were even sorrier.

With the exception.of a critical

shipment of 60,000 tons of seed-potatoes in 1941, the 80 million:
RM in pre-war Belgian agricultural imports from the Netherlands
all but disappeared during the occupation.

This was a matter of

great bitterness on the part of the Military Administration.

It

protested to Berlin on numerous occasions the injustice_of
permitting stubborn Dutchmen to eat better than the more compliant
Belgians. 14 Its final report cited numerous instances in which
the Reichskommissariat Niederlande had sabotaged trade agreements.
With regard to a third possible source of staple imports,
Eastern Europe, results were somewhat more ambivalent.

Belgian

trade with the USSR did not get past the introductory stages.
After lengthy

negc;,tiations in Moscow, _agreement -was reached to

import 120,000 tons of wheat, 55,000 tons of rye arid various other
commodities totalling to some 40 million RM in value.

The German

invasion of the soviet Union unfortunately prevented execution
of.the deal, and virtually no foodstuffs reached occupied Belgium
15
from tha~ source. · Belgian participation in the 1942 Kriegsmesse
in Budapest opened the way for the most successful trade agreement

"
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of the occu!?a tion, _one wi,th Hu~g-ary.

Iri excha.;-ige £:or the sale

of certain Belgian assets in that country and additional amounts
of machinery, Hu!3-_gary agreed in 1943 and 1944 to send over the
Belgian Winterhilfswerk some 27 million RM in goods including .
15., 500 ·tons of wheat, nearly all of which appears to have been

delivered. 16
The Military Administration's.·greatest failure was, o~ cours~,·
the inability to "awakeri the Reich to its export res pons ibi-li ties. "
To be sure, a certain amount of exportation was unavoidable,
especially of feedgrains in the period of transition to autarchy.
In the first year of occupation Germany sent 279 million tons
of cereals (as compared to the 1,208.9 million tons imported
annually between 1935 and, 19.38} •-· This .figure was soon w.orked
down, however:_ to 172 million tons in 1941-1942 and 55 million
tons in 1942-43.

The only other significant delivery was the

emergency provisionment of some 100 tons of eating and seed
potatoes in 1941.

Offsetting these German deliveries were Belgian

ones to the Reich, which increased during the o.c.cupation.

From

the standpoint of nutrition, the most significant of them were
fruit and vegetables (27,200 tons in 1942 and 7300 tons in 1943),
meat (3900 tons in 1943) and horses (10,790 units in 1942 and
6270 in 1943).

The Military Administration estimated that the_

value of such deliveries reduced by half the food exports of
.

Germany to Belgium.

17

The Wehrrnacht units and personnel stationed in the Command
Area was still a further drain on Belgian resources.

Their seizures
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and black·market purchasi~g made a mockery of·officialr~sulation
and created h~ge_gaps in"theBe;tgian food_ supply.

It was thanks

mainly to the strenuous efforts of the Military Administration
that their· excesses were at least partially curbed.

In ~elgium

as presumably elsewhere in occupied Europe, the armed services
were under standing orders to provision themselves locally to
the maximum ~xtent possible. 18 Since the many Army, Air Force,
and Navy contingents scattered throughout the l.and had no idea
as to what they could count on in the way of food supplies from
home and were also quite disinterested in the impact of their
purchasing on Belgian living standards, th~ occupation began with
a mad scramble on the part of troop units and individual personnel
for available food.

In shqrt, they seized or bought at wildly

inflated prices as much as their powers permitted.
The Military Administration took· two important sets of
measures in the attempt to wrest order out of this chaos.

The

first of them, of September 1940, was to put Belgian growers and
processors of c.ertain products under exclusive delivery contracts.
Agreements were arrived at for canned meat, sugar, chocolate,
19
deciduous fruits, nuts, and chicory.
The Military Administration's
reports for the following months provide eloquent.testimony of·
the inadequacy of such arrangements.

In the five weeks b~ginning

l September 1940, for instance, various troop units were known
·:.

to have seized 18 , OOO cattle and 12,000 pigs, more than the amounts
.
20
authorized for the entire quarter. In January 1941,
German
military police broke up a band of smugglers ·.-:hich included thirty
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civilians and fifty railroad ot~i.cials and wa,s run by ''Jewish
emigrants. 11

In its. books appeared the names of numerous troop
·
21
unit paymasters.
The report complained the following month
.

of the common practice, so subversive_of Belgian polici~g efforts,
whereby staffs and units of the Wehrmacht used their official
seals (Dienstsiegel) to "authorize" Belgian dealers to make
black market purchases on their behalf. 22
The Military AdministrationJs second and more important
step, taken August 1941, was to vest exclusive powers for food
· .

purchasing and distribution in Belgium with the Military Intendent.

23

A month later the OKW agreed to principle that the Wehrmacht .
should rely more heavily on provisionment from the home country.
It.was thought possible to.announce to the Bel.gian public that
in the future the forces of occupation would cease to draw supplies
of fat, bread, meat, and potatoes from the land. 24 More important,
however, than any announcement of intentions was the fact that by
August 1941 the troops had completed the planting on seized land
their first potato crop.

It was expected that the 85,000 Morgen

in question would yield 679,476,000 Pfund or enough to supply
5 million Belgians with five hundred grams per day for three and
one-half months! 25
It is impossible to arrive at better than crude estimates
of Wehrmacht consumption of Belgian foodstuffs, since so much of
it went on outside of the purview of the Military Administration.
Figure I provides a list of official Wehrmacht seizures in September
1940 to January 1941.

The Leistungsberichte of 1~42/1943 and

.

,-i~~-r,?r,-i:i;+'J;JY·d•fit£u+

•
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Figure I
Wehrmacht Requisitions
(September 1940 - January 1941)
Pork
Cattle
Butter.
Beans
Sugar
Potatoes
Ri.Ce . ·
Jams
Chocolate
Oats

12,0.00 heads
18, 0_00 heads
1,500,000 kg
3000,tons
10,000 tons
50,000 tons
1000 tons
8000 tons
3000 tons
30,000 tons

(9/40
1/41)
(9/40 -=- 1/41)
1/41)
(9/40
(9/40
11/40)
(9/40
11/40)
11/40)
(9/40
(9/40 - 11/40)
{9/40
11/40)

--

(from Fernand Baudhuin, L'Economie Belge sous
l'Occupation allemande, Brussels~ 1945, p.
)
1943/1944 estimate official delivers to the Militaryintendent
at 199,300 tons (37,760,000 RM) and 304,400 {45,560,000 RM} the
following: }·e;;:.r, about four-fifths the amount ·of Belgian agri:::ultural
exports to -Germany for the years in question.

These estimates

include, however, only a few specified items, notably hay (20,000
tons for both years}, straw (95,000 and 135,000 tons), potatoes
(25,000 and 40,000 tons), .and sugar

(5000 and· 600~ tons) • 26

According to Colard, these figures contain important omissions.
He claims to have seen 1941 and 1942 bills of lading for

Belgian

.. goods from the office of the Military Intendant for 62,540 tons
of sugar, 64,263 tons of flour, 6570 torts of barley,· 9157 tons
·
27
of beans, and 303,510 tons of straw.
Colard, however, also
considers these figures too low, even for the years in question,
and, in a comparison between CNAA food collections and distributions
to Be;lgians arrives at the following figures for "probable"
Wehrmacht consumption of foodstuffs raised in Belgium during
the first half of the occupation.

-13-

J?igure II
J?robable Wehrmacht Consum}?tion
Total Belgian
J?roduction

wem::-macht
Consumption

1,874,000 tons
2,159,000 tons

221.,754 tons
141., 2 64 tons

21,0.54,867 kg
11,424,157 kg

3,954,000 kg
1,974,000 kg

138,795 tons
147,271 tons

21,795 tons
52,771 tons

Potatoes

1941
1942
Margarine
1941
1942
Meat
1941
1942

(From Jean Co lard, L 'Alimen ta tion de ·1a Belgique
sous l'Occupation Allemande 1940-1944, {Louvain,
1945), pp. 161-66.)
Whether the second half of the occupation brought a reduction
in consumption by the armed forces cannot be determined.

The

same is true as concerns the extent of Wehrrnacht reallocations
to Belgians employed in armaments factories.
estimates include black market purchasing.
is scarce indeed.

Nor do these
Data concerning it

In September 1942, the Military Administration

claimed great success in having reduced resort to unofficial
markets in the year since centralizing procurement.

'28

On the

other hand, Wehrmacht allowances for food shipments to the Reich
were raised in April 1942 (to compensate for a reduction in
German rations) to the generous level of

5 kg

~er man/week. 29

seems J?lausible to conclude, then, that a shift occured midway
through the occupation from unit to individual purchasing.

It

It
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. . -1

did not, .however, _effect volume ·s~gnificantly.

There is

general agreement that thro~ghout the occupation Germans in
uniform, or their representatives, paid twice as much on food
black markets as Be~gians. 30
Production control was, ..of course, _the. most important
component of food policy in the occupied country~

To put it

into effect, the Military Administration had to begin from
scratch.

The Belgians took on their own almost none of the steps

essential to prepare the country for the contingency of German
occupation.

This is a very puzzling fact, and the usual explanation--

belief that a Wor14 war I-type food mission would solve all
problems--is not very persuasive.

Nor is a plea of ignorance.

Methods for achieving self-sufficiency were well-understood,
indeed already demonstrating their efficacy in another nation
which depended· on foreign· sources for one-half its food consumption
requirements, Switzerland.
The Swiss began preparing for the contingency of war with
the appointment of a Delegierter fur Kriegswirtschaft in April
1937.

Conversion to self-sufficency in foodstuffs production

was a central part of the overall planning effort.

The ~ask,

undertaken by a commission headed by Friedrich T_. Wahl.en, called
above all for the conversion of some 183,479 ha of grazing land
in ordeJ;" to increase famland to504,812 ha.

The importation of

fee.dgrains could thereby be eliminated without causing a
.

.

.

correspondi~g reduction in livestock which, on its part, would
pe fed on feedlots rather than_ grazed.

·Wahlen expected to provide
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the aver~ge Swiss wi.th 300,0 calories' per day includi~g 80_ grams
of protein and 50-70_ grams of fat.
was introduced in September 1939.

The first st~ge of the plan
--

It :was not put fully into

II

effect during the war itself iri part because Swiss authorities

I

discovered that a ration level of 2400 calories per day was
better for health than the planned 3000~

Still, thanks to the

Wahlen Plan, which added over 1000 calories to the daily diet,
· Switzerland found it possible to live without either grain
imports or rationing of v~getables and ·potatoes during the war.

31

In August 1939 the economist Fernand Baudhuin proposed a
plan for agricultural autonomy based on the Swiss model.

If

adopted~ it might well not only have increased the supply of
food but changed the political climate of the occupation.

Baudhuin

argued that it would be possible to provide an _average per capita
diet of 2500 calories by putting 240,000 ha of grazing land into
cultivation, raising cattle only for milk, making use of low fat
milk products normc;:1.lly fed only to cattle, and. encouraging the
consumption of pork as a source of protein.

In September and

October 1939 the Belgian government published the decrees necessary
\

to begin the conversions but· "becau·se of a bad winter. • · • and the
resistance o.f the Defense Ministry to releasing the necessary
labor • • • the plan remained a dead letter~"

32

;:.

Indeed, the only Belgian food decrees to have taken effect
wei;e rather modest ones orderi~g an increase in stocks.

One,

providing for a special tax to cover storage costs, required
importers of grain to double amounts •in storage.

B::{

I

Hay 1940
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they had risen

to 330,0_00. tons,· enough _for two months· consumption.

Another ·decree ordered margarine producers-to constitute oil
reserves sufficient for thr.ee months output.

A- third ordered an

increase in stocks of frozen meat (insignificant as a percent~ge
.
-33
of overall meat consumption) to cover six months normal requirements. •
These, however, were the only .measures to increase the food
supply enacted by the Belgian gove_rnment prior to the occupation
which, in addition did nothing to set up an organization capable
of administering a food policy for the nation.
CNAA was created to fill the vacuum in food policy.

At

first, the Military Administration attempted to work thro4gh
existing structures.

On 4 Jun_e 1940 it described as "good"

cooperation with the two Ministries of Food and Agriculture. 36
A·s of l August, however, _it had been decided to combine t~em under
secretary General De Winter, then recently returned_from a flight
to the south of France, in order to make it possible to deal in
comprehensive fashion with problems of production, processing,
and rationing. 35 It soon became apparent, however, that the
bases for a food policy simply had not been laid.

The land

cadaster dated from 1929 and was comp~etely inadequate.

It was-

well-neigh impossible to arrive at meaningful estimates of
available foodstocks, a situation due to Wehrmacht seizures as
well as the inadequacies of the Belgian administration.
controls and rationing existed only on paper.

Price

Above all, nothing

ha.d been done to prepare. the cultivators fo·r the introduction
of·production controls. 36

•

.
.
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On 27 A.~gust 1940, _amidst_ great fanfare, _the ·corporation
.

.

nationale de l'Agriculture et de ·1 1·Alimentation was created asa Belgian analogue to the Reichsnahrstand (the German Food Estate).
The new organization was presented to the public less as the
product of the emergency conditions·of war than as something
that would put the agriculture of the country on a new footirg
in the period of· peace to follow it.
on the new entity.

Vast powers were bestowed·-

It could not only regulate-production but

abolish existing associations of producers, suspend or shut
down the operations of processors, regulate sales and consumption,
and impose dues and penalties on enterprises.

Membership was

compulsory fo_r all producers and processors who, as in the Reich,
were obliged to market through so"'.'"cal.led Conunodi ty Group .
Authorities.

There were ten CGAs:. Grain and Feed; Milk, Fat

and Eggs; Livestock and Meat; Horticulture,-vegetables, and Fruit;
Seeds and Fertilizer; sugar and Commercial Specialty Crops;
·potatoes; Fish and Fish Products; Breweries, Malt Factories,
Pistilleries, -and Beverages; and Groceries.

While some CGAs, for

instance for fish, appear to have had little more than a shadow
existence, others established depots at the major market centers
for crop and livestock collection.

Representatives of producers

and processors served as "honorary trustees·" of the CGAs at the
provincial level but-professional staff of CNAA performed the
administrative labors.
in B_russels.

Policy was of course made at headquarters

It soon mushroomed into a h~ge apparat with the

full panoply of "functional departments" for _personnel and legal

-18-

questions, press and public relations, _statistics and research,
production technique,production goals, production supplies and
means of production, and professional organization and .arbitration.
But while the new o~ganization employed tho1..1sands of paper
shufflers, data_ gatherers, snoopers,. "controller.s;" official
ideologists; .and p.r. men, it was woefully short of technical
personnel.

The chief of CNAA, De Winter, was a mining engineer

by training
and among his deputies was to be found not a single
'
.
· 37

figure· with_ a background in agriculture. ·

:All Belgian commentators who endured the occupation agree
in condemning the CNAA.
representative.

Baudhuin's scathing remarks are

He judged it necessary "To put M. De Winter

before the pillory in the. fape o:L history_ as a means. _of providing
an example to all those who are entrusted with responsibilities
for which ·they are not suited and to all persons in power
(dirigeants) who because of. • • incompetence. -~ • and presumption
accept high office only to plunge their.country into unutterable
misery.

1138

In short, the CNAA has become .the scapegoat for the·

food problems of the occupied nation.

While admittedly difficult

to defend, the Corporation deserves this role only in part.

In

fact, _it lacked the power to act more constructively than it did.
The first count in the Belgian indictment of CNAA concerns
pr~ce policy •. But while it points to the existence of a real
•

evil, it misplaces blame for it.

The main culprit was the overall

system of wage and price controls instituted by the Military
Administration and supported by the authors of the "Politics of

Figure III
Retail Food Prices During the Occupation

----------------------------------~-·--·~~·-------·
-· ...._ ·---___,
Official Prices
Black Market Prices
Index( Aug.1939""100)
--------·-·- ---~---·--·•..................
15 Aug.1939 15 Apr~l940
·----_..J.1/~g__ 1L1!~... _ _.,.,U~-~ ___7/42
Bread
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Cheese
Whole milk

K

1 1 82

K 0 1 60
K 14,22
L. 1,58
Eggs
P 0,64
Farm butter
K 19,94
Creamery butte:i:;- K 21,73
4,67
sa.lmon*.
18,90
Santos c.offee*
K 4,06
Chicory
2 1 84
Rice*
Sugar
K 4,45
Beans
K 3,02
L 5,82
Peanut Oil
K 0,62
Table salt
K 10,39
Margarine
18 1 81
Cocpa.*
10.58
Chocolate*
K 3,52
Shelled peas
Macaroni
K 7,22
Sardines
.4,49
5,57
Beef fat
Steak
K 24,91
Hamburger·meat K l~,~S
K 11,83
soup.bones
Pork cotelette K 21,47
13~31
Lard*
Shortening*
10, 75

2,41
0,83
16,64
1,79
0,57
26,77
28 1 61
5,53
20,95
4 1 62
3,50
5,24
. 4,79
8,77
0,11
11,20
21 1 07
;U,83
4 1 53
7,89
5,17
6,72
25,67
12,93
12,38
20,96
13,92
11,91.

2,88
2,45
28,50
·2,83
1,60
41 1 51
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5,81
3 1 50
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6,32
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2,44
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13,66 27,00
30,83 28,44
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-40,00 K 109,80
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1.149~20· 2.345 4.545 6.110
28,44 K 441,01
861,55
1.054,75 · 3.820 7.745 9.969
16,00 K 404,15
816,34
24,35
962
787
692
5,42 K 33,86
27,69
77,94 1.038 1.140. 1.080
9 1 30 K 74,93
82,33
62,30
855 1.300 1.388
18~50 B 38,37
58,35
334,68 4.150 6.140 6.008
15,00 K 231,21
342,04
184,76
470
705
742
35 1 04 K 116,96
175,54
152,30
696 1.055 1.214
21,96 K 87,41
132,41
154,37.. 726 1.170 1.305
24,15 K 85,94
138,47
196,73
780
929
916
34,19 K 167,52
199,49
284~84 1.653 2.092 2.140
29,79 K 219,96
284,38
346,42 2.238 3.219
3.223
25!.~~o~-~-~-~J?,.!.._6_0__ ~~~~~~~~-- _...,...._
.. ....

2,90.
2,77
28,81
2,80
1,62
41 1 32
45,43'
1,00
29,00
8 1 46
3~50
8~18
6,53

K
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* Unobtainable at official prices

•·•-·,.,~ ,

....I

(from Fernand Baudhuin, L'Economie Belge sous l'Occupation allemande
(Brussels, 1945) pp~408, 410)
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Production.'' . CNAA played merely a supporting role in maintaining

it.

The economic facts in the ·case against CNAA price policy·

are indisputable.

food prices, i t is .a~gued. 1 _were set so low that

cultivators, who wei.-e obliged to buy seed and fertilizer on black
markets, .had no choice but to sell on them as well. 3 9
indicates,

As Figure III

a. huge gap existed between official prices, which

roughly doubled during the occupation, and black markets prices,
which skyrocketed.

It is also evident that if some approximation

of the market clearing price had been adopted additional farm
output would have flowed into official channels, ration levels
could have been raised, and ~ood distributed on a more equita~le
basis. ··To have increased prices to such levels' would, however,
have dest::::-o:i-·ed the emplo:t·ee incentive to report fer work.

Wages

and salaries were raised only 10 percent during the occupation.
E~en at the artificially low official levels, food costs--as
numer_ous studies of the sociologist Jacquemyns attest--absorbed
over sixty percent of the budget of typical worki~g class famili.~s. 4 O

The Military Administration and the di~ectors of Belgian finance
and industry both opposed the obvious corrective to this situation,

a wage increase, on the grounds that i t would raise production
costs.

As a matter of policy they preferred to feed workers at

the plant and force their wives, children and retired parents· to
;..

deal on the black market even though such activity was forbidden
by strict penalties.

CNAA deserves censure for having enforced.

this policy--:--for serving as the corrupt and hypocritical controleur
'

on an ''illegal" ma,rket whose existence was nearly. as essential for
the success of German policy of economic exploitation as it·was
for the survival of the Belgian public.

Figure IV
Cereal Acreage in Cultivation (in hectares)
1929

1938 (1)

1940(2)

1941

154.000
184. 00-0
10.000

174.000
154.000
12.000

146.ooo .·
115.000
10. o·oo

l78.000 ..
126.000
10. ooo

348.000

340.000

271.000

Other

25.000
226.000
1.000

31.000
213.000
1.000

Non Bread9rains
Total
·

252.000

TOTAL

600.000

1943

1"944

193.000
137.000
14.000

203.000
158.000
.14. 000

198.000
141.000
14.000

314.000

344.000

375.000

353.000

24.000
172.000
1. 00.0

30.000
1 7.000
2.000

51.000
142. 000
3.000

77.000
125.000
·2.000

74.000
127~000
1.000

245. 000

197.000

199.000

196.000

204.000

202.000

585.000

486.000

513. 000

540.000

579.000

555.000

.. 1942

Breadgrains
Wheat

Rye
Spelt, Maslin
Breadgrains
Total
Non Breadgrains

Barley
Oats ·

(from Fernand Baudhuin, L'Economie Belge sous !'Occupation allemande
(Brussels,· 1945) p. 245)
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The ·second count of the indictment against CNAA. concerns the
failure to undertake the necessary large-scale conversions from
pasturage to farmla.nds.

The Corporation•~ record in this respect

was indeed a dismal one.

As indicated in Figure IV, cereal

acreage in cultivation increased from 468,000 ha in 1940 to 555,000
in 1944, _but never reached the 600,000 of 1929 or even the 585,000
of 1938.

It is nonethe~ess somewhat shortsighted to condemn

these results

a

la Baudhuin as if they were due _solely to the

technical incompetence of CNAA policy-makers.

More important

considerations were in play, .above all the questionable ability
of the organization to impose policy on a farm population unused
to controls, suspicious of central authority, divided into two
language blocs, and, above all, .6perating in a ~ell~r•s market •.
Both the Military Administration and CNAA believed, in short,
that a policy of conversion ran unacceptable
political risks.
.
.

While recognizing its desirability, even necessity, neither one
was willing to do the job.

This, at any rate, was the outcome

of protracted discussions between the two in September and October
\

1940.

The opportunity, once missed, would not, however, return. 4 ~

The near-famine situation of Winter 1940-1941 undermined the·
confidence of the Belgian public in the Military Administration's
competence in matters of food policy to such an· extent that the
imposition of conversions on a large scale was never a serious
possibility thereafter.

The matter did not come up again.

Whether intentionally or not, _the production controls set
up by CNAA and the Military Administration work.~d in such .a way
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as to provide the cultivate~ wi.th_ generous surplusses to sell
on grey.·

o:i::

black ma:i::kets.

choice in the matter.

They may not in. fact have had much

First, they faced political problems

which undermined the ·attempt to lay the basis for comprehensive
planning on the Reich model.

Initially, _the Military Administration

entertained high hopes of winning over the volkstilmlich and
conservative peasantJ;y, particularly in Flanders, 42 to the New
Order.

Instead, they encountered constant foot-dragging which,

at times, broke·out into open resistance.

The.land.surveys

taken each spring, for instance, invariably resulted in gross
underestimates of cropland and were worthless as planning tools.
The attempt of

summer

1942 to introduce the Hofkarte

(described by Brandt as the essential source of the r·aw data
for the compilation of running surveys of the national food
supply situation) touched off armed resistance among the peasantry
of the Ardennes, necessitated Gestapo intervention and exemplary
punishment (deportation to KZs), and had to be dropped. 43
The uncertain supply situation also militated against the
imposition of quotas which were too-high or rigid.

Several

times, for instance, Berlin seized without warning large amounts
of fertilizer, a normally abundant commodity.

In 1940-1941 this

amounted to 43,000 tons of Thomas slag, and in the following year,
30,200 tons.

In.late 1942,_the Reich also requisitioned 11,500

44
.
tons of pu:r;-e ammonia for the production of ni· trogen f er t·1·
i izer.
Transpo:r;-tation problems also created headaches for planners~
✓

In

Spring 1942 a railroad tie-up prevented delivery of 24,000 tons

--24-

of seed potatoes.

For the same reason, _a major deal of December

1943 with Roumania for 100,000 tons of whe<:1,t could never be
executed.

45

Under the circumstances, then, i t probably made good

sense not to attempt to control planting but merely to impose
del.iv.er~ quotas, .whigh, while high enough to meet ration requirements,
were low and flexible enough to gua~antee the profitability of
f9:rming.
These principles in fact governed the "plans de culture"
adopted for the successive crop years of the occupation.

At

first planned outputs were based on excessively low estimates
of farm.acreage and yields.

Later, as more land entered cultivation,

delivery quotas were made more flexible.

The farmer was, in other

words, left to dispose of either free land or free crops.

The

gradual increase in land under cultivation has been noted above.
• As for the quotas, in 1941-1942 the so-called "production unit"
was adopted as a delivery standard.
the following:

It corresponded to any of

1 kg of breadgrains; 1 kg of barley; 7 kgs of

potatoes; .8 kg of dried beans; 10 kg of sugar beets;

.7 kg of

· winter colza (for which additional incentives were provided);
-

.55 kg of summer colza; 10 kg of chicory roots; 2 kg of straw.

46

In the same year, so called "contract deliveries" were introduced
for potatoes.

They permitted the consumer to purchase up to

120 kgs_ per year directly from the_ grower. 47

In 1942-1943, moreover,

it-became possible for the farmer to dispense with delivery quotas
by agreeing to plant 70% of his land in rationed crops.

The

amount of the marketable surplusses left after required deliveries·
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na tu.:r;ally depended on assumpti_ons concerning yields as we11 · as
amounts of acreage under cultivation. - Cola.:r;d estimat,es, _based
on-prewar yields and official 1941 acreage under cultivation,
that 1 million tons of potatoes were raised in addition to the
2,080,000 tons called for by the delivery quotas.

He estimates

1940 cereal production at ___533,000 tons instead of the 445-,000
tons targeted for that year.

And in the case of easily-concealed

poultry, _he notes that the 1941 quota, set at 345 million eggs,
assumed a laying-hen population of 3 million, as compared to
a prewar population of 18 million, which he estimates would
.

produce between 510 and 765 million eggs per- year.

48

Doubtless in part thanks to such relative liberality it was
possibie-to increase output and supplies-on-hand, r3.ise rati0ns
slightly and, above all, distribute them more-reliably.

Statistics

on Belgian £arm output, even the official portion of it, are very
approximate for the war years.

According to data from the Ministere

des Affaires Economiques bread grain production rose from 685,000

tons in 1941 to 721,000 tons, 879,000 tons, and 819,000 tons in
the following years of the occupation period, rising in the end
to 92 percent of the 1935-1938 average.

Potato output increased

from 1,609,000 tons, to 2,086,000 tons, 2,212,000 tons, 2,120,000
tons, and 2, 0_07, 000 tons over the same period, in the final year
reaching, however, only 64 percent of the 1935~1938 average. 49
The available official data conc.erning livestock simply do not
make much sense.

In

short, the population did not decrease to

the extent that one would estimate on the basis of the feed and
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fodder supply.

It is clear, .first, _that no fee~grain imports

(l.2 million tons prewar avei~ge) occurred during the occupation
and, second, that a portion of feed and fodder land was shifted
to crops for direct human consumption.

Domestic feedgrain

production declined from an annual average of· 640,000 tons from
1935 to 1938_ to 434,000 tons during the occupation, that of fodder
beets from 5,538,000 tons and 4,206,000 respectively.

(The ;increase

in oilseed output between 1940 and 1944 was not significant
·enough to have affected the overall fodder supply.)

At the same

time, however, the official livestock population remained at a
relatively constant high level.

The number .of·_ horses actually

increased from 246,000 in 1939 to 278,000 in 1944;_the number of
cattle fell only slightly from l,GG0,000 to 1,440,000 over the
same years--although a shift occurred from livestock to dairy;
there was actually an increase in the sheep population, 153,000
to 1Q9,000, and of goats from an official z~ro to 119,ooo. 50
One finds substantial declines only in-two species:

the fecund

and omnivor.ious pig, from 856,000 to 635,000, and the laying hen,
which, improbably below even.official -statistics concerning egg
\

output, officially declined in number to 2~376,000 during the
· .
51
occupation.
Increases ~n rations reflect only partially the
geneI;'a.l improvement in the.food supply~

The most significant

change was the increase of the bread ration in 1943 -from 225 gr/day
;;;

to 300.

The potato ration remained until June 1944 at 500 gr/day;

meat declined gradually after 1940 from 35 gr/day to 20 gr/day by
June 1944, but the resumption in Spring 1912 of fishing in the
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Channel somewhat offset the fall; butter and ma.:rgerine remained
at about the ·initial. level of 14.9_ gr for most of the period.
More important than such nominal changes, authorized rations
·

gradually became more easy to obtain.

52

From mid-Summer 1942

until the end of the· occupation, consumers seem to have had
comparatively little difficulty in securing- wpat was officially
their due.

Until :then, however, _there. were only three months

during which more than one-half of the authorized potato ration
could .be supplied. 53

'
Not surprisingly, the Military Administration's

first annual report described the food supply situation as its
greatest single worry, indeed" • • ~the key to the production
problem. 11

54

And well it might have:

the food shortages of 1941

caused thA most direct challenge it would face during the
occupation.
It stemmed from two groups, the coal miners and the business
leaders in Brussels.· At stake were questions of fundamental
.

importance for Belgium's lot in Hitler's Europe:

would Belgian

industry work for the German war effort even without food
compensation for the nation? and would the Military Administration
succeed in asserting the power to favor in food allocation those
persons working directly for the interests of the Reich at the
expense of those who were more expendable?

Although the outcome

hung for a time in the balance, the Military Administration emerged
triumphant in both cases.
'rhe food crisis of Winter 1941 came with plenty of notice.
The military events of Hay and June 1940 disrupted Spring plantings,
particularly of potatoes.

In Summer numerous-and often unauthorized
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. 55
seizures of Wehrmacht troop units depleted foodstocks.

By

the end of A~gust, stocks of both cereals and fat were · rep.orted
to be at an end.

56

In the following months the ·Military

Administration reported that food shortages were undermining
the.effectiveness of the campaign to win the goodwill 9f the
population~· It warned Berlin specifically that housewives
were standing in line for hours in vain attempts to secure the
meagre authorized rations, Belgians blamed shortages of foodstuffs
on Wehrmacht confiscations, the black market in foodstuffs was
growing at an alarming rate, and factory workers were not eating
enough to do a full day's work.

By December potatb rations had

become all but unobtainable in many parts of the country:
throughout Wallonia, coal miners had appeared in frqnt of city
halls, waving empty potato sacks in silent protest.

It was also

reported that "pro-German" industrialists were beginning to
harbor second thoughts about collaborating.

57

Serious miner strikes broke out in the Squthern Basin and.
lasted through mid-April 1941.

Figure V provides a list of

outbreaks includ·ing the numbers of strikers and days struck.
These strikes were not "political," that is directed at changing
either the work situation or national policies.
did so only in order to get enough to eat.

Those who .struck

With the exception

of the final group of strikers, the Military Administration
therefore dealt with the work stoppages not as if they were acts
of <:iefiance but as "objectively justified" (sachlich begrlindet)
responses to the foo"d shortages.

Repressive measures were avoided
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The Coal Stri.kes
Date
11
7
. 14
26
29
13
19
21
22
11
27
28
29
13
11
14
27
29
31
3

4
5

10
12
17
20

Sept. 1940
Oct • 1940
Oct. 1940·
Oct. 1940.
Oct~ 1940
Dec. 1940
Dec~ 1940
Jan. 1941
Jan. 1941
Jan. 1941
Jan. 1941
Jan. 1941
Jan. 1941
Feb. 1941
Mar. 1941
Mar. 1941
Mar •. 1941
Mar. . 1941
Mar. 1941
Apr. 1941
Apr. 1941
1941
Apr.
May · 1941
1941
May
1941
May
May
1941

District
, Liege
Charleroi
Liege
Charleroi
Liege
Liege
Liege
Liege
Liege
Liege
Liege
Liege
Liege
Mons
Liege=l Pit
.Lieg~=l Pit
Mons
Mons
Mons
Mons
Mons
Mons
Liege
.. Liege
FK Hasselt
FK Hasselt

Number of
Strikers

Number.of
bays Struck

311·.
120
103
280
180
116
150
65
303
166
2.809)
3.898)
3.437)
2.950
not regis)
not regis)
330
400
_860

1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1

s.ooo

8.200
4.000
1.736
10. 000
7. 000)
10.672)

7

2
l
1
1
l
1
1
1
1
1

(from Jahresbericht der Militarverwaltun~ funB.as
erste
I
Einsatzj ahr. - (Anlage Cl 7) {TS0l/104/1012)
\

~here possible.

Instead, the Military Administration enticed

the miners back to work with food.

During these weeks, something

called Hilfszug Bayern ("Relief Train 'Bavaria'") was shunted
from mine siding to mine siding.

From it, striking workers were

issued at the pithead food from Belgian stocks by the men of
the Wehrmacht.

At the same time, the district_ governors of the

Military Administration, the Kormnandanturen, began to set up
works-kitchens ('i•Jerkskti.chen) to insure that armaments workers
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received the full allotment of their "heavy-" and ''very heavy
-

..

labor" rations (Schwer.- und Schwerstarbei te;rationen.)

58

These

actions brought to a head the festering crisis in relations between
the Military Administration and the leaders of Belgian business.
! .

·It was· bad enough, they felt, that no assurances had been
✓-

received regarding food imports as compensation for their
contribution to the Axis.

Was the Occupying.Power now to give

food only to those working in its behalf, in the meantime
allowing the rest of the population to starve?
Fear of this possibility triggered a number of'serious
protests from within the business community, set in.motion a
serious attempt to circumvent the authority of the Military
Adi..tinistration, and brought about a reconsideration of the
"Politics of Production" at the top-level~ of finance and
industry, which for a time even seemed to betoken an end to
economic collaboration.

The first indication of the new mood

was a 7 March 1941 letter of protest from the industrial associations

fo~ coal, steel, manufacturing, textiles, and construction to
the Secretaries-General (career chiefs of th~ Belgian civil
service).

It demanded that the public be guaranteed a minimum

standard of nutrition before any additional allocations be made
to armaments workers.

By the middle of the month, manufacturers

had begun to annul orders on the grounds that employees were too
;;

undernourished to work.

CNAA Chief De Winter even delivered a

speech blaming the wehrmacht for food shortages~
protested an inability t6 step up mine cutout.

Coal operators
Vice-Governor

I

I
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Cattier of the Societe Generale .de Belgique, _the laz-gest Be~gian
holding company, stated openly his further opposition to any
stock-swaps (Kapitalverflechtungen) with German firms.

The

Chairman of the construction steel car.tel, Joassert, resigned
in opposition to the effort to. organize an official business
association (Wirtschaftgruppe) for his industry; the Chambersof-Commerce, after having cooperated in this effort, now also
expressed objections.

Tragically, a M. Jottrand o-f the _Mons

chapter of "Sycobel," the cartel for construction steel, was
arrested by the Gestapo for having advised the directors of his
organization to oppose the demands of the Occupying. Power_ "with
all the means at their disposal. 1159

The unauthorized trip of

Governor Galopin of the Societe·Gen~rale to Berlin in the last
week of March,_ which·in fact Military Administration Chief Reeder
tried to prevent, culminated the "passive resistance" of the
businessmen.

Thanks apparently to the good offices of Director

Abs of the Deutsche Bank, Galopin-managed to present the Belgian
case for -specia_l treatment in 'food matters 'to t·he senior officials
of several ministries.

Although the details of the Galopin

.
.
·
f a1.'l ure. GO
mission
are no t k nown, 1.· t was an o b v1.ous
-

Belgian capitulation followed in short order, at a meeting
convoked by Galopin for 1 April 1941 at the corporate headquarters
of.la Generale.

some twenty~four dignitaries from-the world of

business pa:i:-ticipated, bankers and industrialists mainly but-also
a few powerful lawyers and at least one well-known economist.
Several of them expressed grave reservations about the course

I

-i
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followed, in particular as r~gards the lack of German reciprocity
in foodstuffs.

In the end, however, there was unanimity that

a break with the "Politics of Production" could not be considered. 61
As concerns the second issue, .namely opposition to .the Military
Administration's "favoritism" of armaments workers in respect
·'

to food allocation, employers had little choice but drop the
insistence on "equal rations for all Belgians" arid follow the
German example.

.In short, they set up their own food dispei:iseries,

supplied f.rom the black market, in order to provide the necessary
incentives to keep employees reporting for work •. This "food
paternalism" became nearly universal in Belgian industry, taking
on truly massive proportions.

Firms supplied not only prepared

meals to "heavy" and "verc1 heavy" laborers, but eventually also
goods in k_ind that could be taken home to feed families.

The

Military Administration estimated that food supplements added
36 percent -to wage and salary costs.

The various Kontrolldienste

had orders specifically not to in~erfere with black market food

procurement by firms, in part because the highly profitable big
firms·could easily bear the expenses involved. 62 More importantly,
\

~seven the official history of the Military Administration's
price control unit admits, l'without such illegal employer supplements
.
·
.
63
the situation of the worker would have been unbearable."
While it is evident that Belgian employers no less than the
Occupying Power and the Be~gian public depended on the black
market in food, the thing itself must remain something of a
mystery.

For obvious reasons the evidence concerning it is
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scanty.

Still,

a

few conclusions_can be reached with regard

to supply and distribution.

The ·11 unofficial farm output," that

is -the surplusses left for cultivators to dispose of, was surely
one important source of supply.
be guessed at.

The amounts involved can only·

One must begin with mention that during the

occupation neither official outputs nor acreage for cereals
reached 90 percent of the 1929 total.
~hi~

-

Even this figure represents

.

only---y-- percent of total farm and grazing land.

It is unclear

how much of this additional land was actually in cultivation.
Colard's estimate, the only one available, sets wheat acreage
in cultivation at no less than twice the official figure. 64 _
It must also be assumed that cultivators were able to dispo·se
freely of

/:I.

portion of the output from registered cropland.

The

rule in effect after 1942 that cultivators could dispense with
quotas by planting 70 percent of their official holdings with
ration~d crops indicates that CNAA was prepared to permit

.
unofficial sale, or consumption, from 30 percent of the total.
The "miniplots" provided a second important source.of supplementary
food.

Before the war, there were some 838,883 "midget farms" of

less that one hectare.

Normally non-commercial uni ts a.nd too

small to supervise, they totalled some 130,000 hectares or slightly
more· than 7 percent of total farm area~ 5

The addition of parks,

lawns, gardens and vacant lots probably added another 1 •. 5-25 percent
to total land in cultivation.

There was, finally, a huge traffic

in goods smuggled into the country from France and the Netherlands.
Statistical evidence concerning it is most scanty of all.

It is
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there~ore. wm:;th mentioni~g that ~gr:icultural oj;:f;icials in the
two Departments of; France attached to the Germ~·n military
,.

gove:t;"nrnerit in Brussels believed that in 1941:no less than 80,000
tons of breadgra,in was smuggled from their t4rritory into Belgium.

66

I

If so, .it would have added ten percent to th7 Be~gian supply for
.

that year.

.

In sum, it is reasonable to conclude that food from
!

nunofficial '' · sources may well have equalled official domestic
output.
i'

a

The data available concerning cons.umptibn confirms this_
i

supposition.

The OSS estimated average Belgian 1943-1944

'consumption at 2020 calories; the League of ~ations, "average
I

.

:

.

-

worker family consumption" at 2335 calo~ies·ber capita. 67

If

colard is correct ih stating that the averag¢ Belgian received
only about 1000 calories per day from officikl rations, then the
importance of the black market in the ·Belgia~ di_et is self-evident.
I

Even the Military Administration had to admit that it indeed
provided the margin of survival.

Its report:of June through
I

'

September 1941 related that a German inspectbr of the Louvain
!

l

federal prisoµ had recently discovered that ~ts inmates, who
received official ~ations and presumably nothing more, had begun
-to starve en masse.

68

They t oo h a d t o b e prpvi
. I. . d e d wi. th. supp 1emen t s.
i
.
>

i

Because of the lack of any symstematic 1study of food
!

distribution by class and region, _little mor:e can be said about
.

I

the ~atter at this point than what has been ]~uggested above,
except that access to black market .food, or jproviders of it, was
.

iI

a more important determinant of how one ate :than professional
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rank or earning power.

The :power to obt3.in food, in other

words, depended less on the amount one was ·able to spend than
on

proximity to stocks, _the political powe:i:-

of one's

employer, the amount of time one could spend in deali~g on the
_black market, regional dif f e:tentials in prices, _and only in
the final instances on earnings which were, in any case, both
frozen and eroded by inflation.

Certain groups, it is obvious,

fared relatively well, while others languished.

The distinction

between the two, not to mention those within each group, is,
however, by no means always clear.
It was simply taken for_ granted-by all concerned that the
cultivators of Belgium's 300,000 farms would be allowed to
maintain prewar levels of consumption.
food problem agree that they q.id.

All commentators on the

Baudhuin believes that they

consumed, among other things, the bulk of the phantom pork
69 _ Another f ortunate group co·nsiste
.
d o f t h ose owning
.
popu l ation.

the 800,000 plots of less than one hectare.

To it belonged the

_members of one out of every 2.5 Belgian families.
emphasized that many of the

11

It should be

midget farms" were owned by ·artisans,

\factory workers, and miners and worked on a part time basis by
their families.

''Heavy" and "very heavy workers" also fared

better than average, although hardly well. - According to a League.
of Nations report, they consumed at 82 percent of the prewar
rate.as compared to 74. percent for other work~rs.

7(J

Even tho~gh

the total amounts involved were not significant, -it should be
added that members of the Belgian

ss, miscellaneous political
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Figure VI

Loss or Gain in Weight*

May 1939end of 1941

Beginning of 1942end of 1943

-Number of cases of weight loss
greater than 1.5 kg

75%

1 1 . 8.%

-Number of cases of weight gain

13%

54.3%

Average amount of weight loss

7,000 kgs

Average amount of weight gain

----

1 , 78 O kgs

*Based on studies of 10,000 workers.

(From Jacquemyns, La Societe Belze sous l'Occu ation Allemande
1940-194. Privations et Espoirs Brussels, 1946)
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collaborators, _and favored officials also received "very heavy
labor" rations.

And i:.he.obvious point must a1so be made that

those persons and professional_ groups well"'."positioned to traffic
on the black market ate better than those who were not.

It may

also be true, as Jacguemyns suggests, that inhabitants of
regions bordering France and the Netherlands generally had more
to eat than those of the interior. 71

The one general category

not benefiting from any of these advantages was the residents
of the big cities-~Brussels, Antwerp, Ghent, and Liege--especially
workers in the service industries, government employees, office
workers, pensioners, and their dependents.

(Children and

pregnant women received modest food supplements.)

All descriptions

confirm the impression that this group bore a disproportionate

,i

share of the suffering.

i

.,1

_Public health fell catastrophically during the first nine
months of the occupation, stabilized, then improved slightly
over the rema:i.ning months prior to Liberation.

As indicated

by Figure VI weight losses of five to ten kg were not uncommon
during the first period but soon after made up thanks to both
changes in physical metabolism and improvements in the food
supply.

An increase in the incidence of only one malady has been

traced back to the austere diet of the·occupation years,.
· \...the number of___g~13:1;hs from which rose from 4415 in 1939 to a wa.~ime maximum __/

tunerculosrs, wh,;icfi.--~.om -

'1---- of~-641lr-

in 1941

and which. afflicted the Charleroi area with special severity.

The

much-feared "hunger edema'' did not put in a signif·icant appearance.
The dietary situation also had negligible effect on rates of
birth and ~eath for the occupation perioa. 72

,,,•

:,
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The history of Be~gian food supply problems during World
war II, sad though it is, has a hopeful side as well.

Even

without benefit of· planning, the nation· proved.able to feed
itself.

It disposed; in short,·of resources and strengths of

which it was_ not fully aware.

Planning on the Swiss model

might well have made it possible to have raised output somewhat
and surely would ·have provided the basis for more equitable_
distribution than that which took place-.

It is also possible,

however, that better organization and additional production
would only have profited the Occupying Power.

The rea.l difference

in ·having or not having a policy for agricultural self-sufficiency
was felt on the export side.

The "Politics of Production" was
.·.

at least in part a response to the belief that Belgium could
not live without food imports.

If Belgians had enjoyed the same

confidence as the Swi~s that they could indeed grow enough
to provide for their consumption requirements it might well have
been possible for their land not to have served as an arsenal of
fascism.

-

'
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